RBP IP TP

3.1.2 (e) Provisions on capacity allocation, congestion management and anti-hoarding and reutilisation procedures

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“Provisions on capacity allocation, congestion management and anti-hoarding and re-utilisation procedures”

General rules of capacity auctions

In case of capacity congestion, the capacities are allocated within the framework of capacity auction procedures pursuant to the Commission Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 (CAM NC) and the Capacity Booking Platform Regulation (CBP Regulation).

Capacity auctions take place on the Regional Booking Platform (RBP).

Regional Booking Platform (RBP) –shall mean the electronic capacity trading platform which is a capacity booking platform complying with Law No. XL of 2008 on Natural Gas Supply (GET) and CAM NC. The RBP Application and RBP Portal jointly constitute the Regional Booking Platform.

The RBP Application (https://rbp.eu/APP) is the Internet-based securely accessible test and production software environments of the RBP.

The RBP Portal (https://rebp.eu) is the RBP’s publication and information website that is publicly available on the internet.

In accordance with the CAM NC, the RBP ensures the allocation of the standard and non-standard apacities.

The different stages of the auction procedure are listed in Point 9 of the CBP Regulation.

Yearly, annual quarterly, rolling quarterly, monthly standard and seasonal non-standard capacities are allocated with the ascending-clock auction. Daily and within-day capacity products are allocated with the uniform-price auction.

Ascending clock auction means an auction in which the Network User places requested quantities against defined price steps, which are announced sequentially.

Uniform price auction means an auction in which the Network User in a single bidding round bids price as well as quantity, and all Network Users, who are successful in gaining capacity, pay the price of the lowest successful bid.

In case of primary capacity allocation, the rules of bidding on the RBP Application (https://rbp.eu/APP) are defined in Point 10 of the CBP Regulation.

The descriptions of the ascending clock auction algorithm and the uniform price auction algorithm are stated in the CAM NC (Sections 17 and 18) and in the CBP Regulation (Points 13 and 14).  

The ENTSOG auction calendar defines the starting date of capacity allocation procedures regarding interconnection entry/exit points as well as the storage entry/exit points. The starting date of capacity allocation procedures regarding other entry/exit points is established in the capacity auction calendar of the Governmental Decree No 19/2009 (I.30.) (VHR).

The respective current auction calendar is published on the RBP Portal.

The terms and conditions for the participation in the capacity auction are published here by FGSZ Ltd.    

 

Procedural rules for returning capacities and taking back capacities 

Return of booked capacity

(a) Save for one-day or even shorter capacity bookings, the TSO shall accept the return of firm capacity booked at a given interconnection entry/exit point by the network user. 

(b) Firm capacities offered to be returned shall be taken into consideration as free capacities in the sale of short-term capacities if they were returned before 12 a.m. on the working day prior to the publication date of the auction concerning the given short-term capacities. 

(c) The rights and obligations arising from the network usage contract shall be reserved by the network user until and to the extent any part of the capacity returned by it is sold again by the TSO of which the TSO shall immediately notify the network user. 

(d) The capacity returned shall be registered among the available capacities for network users during booking procedures. 

(e) Capacities returned may only be sold after the sale of other available firm capacities at the given point by TSO. 

(f) The network user surrendering their capacity is exempt from all kinds of liability arising from the surrendered capacity only after the liabilities arising from the booking contract come into effect after the reselling of the surrendered capacity. If the TSO sells the surrendered capacity at an auction, the network user surrendering the capacity shall not receive a share of the possible auction premium revenue

 

Take back of booked capacity

  1. a) The return of a part or the whole of the capacity booked and regularly left unused by the network user at a given interconnection entry/exit point shall be accepted if the unused capacity was not sold by the network user in secondary capacity trade, and other network users request firm capacity booking at the given interconnection entry/exit point, but there is no sufficient firm capacity available at the given point. 
  2. b) Booked capacities may be considered regularly unused if: 
  3. the contract applies to a period longer than one year, and on average less than 80 % of the booked capacity is used both between 1 April and 30 September, and 1 October and 31 March according to the allocated date, and such conduct was not properly justified; or 
  4. the first nomination submitted for a given gas day is regularly higher than 80 % of the capacity booked, but the last valid nomination resulting from the re-nomination(s) submitted for the given gas day is less than 80 % of the booked capacity. 
  5. c) In the procedure under paragraph (b), if the TSO finds that, on the basis of the allocated data, the network user holding a contract concluded for a period longer than one year, on average uses less than 80 % of the booked capacity both between 1 April and 30 September, and 1 October and 31 March, the TSO shall notify the Authority and the network user concerned about the fact of the unused capacity.

In the notice the TSO shall indicate that other network users submitted requests for firm capacity at the given network point and this request could not be satisfied for the lack of available capacity. At the request of the Authority the network user shall verify within 5 days that the capacity booked, but not used has been sold or offered for sale in secondary capacity market. If based on the reasoning the Authority decides that the unused capacity has not been offered for sale by the network user with reasonable terms and conditions on the secondary market, then it shall issue a resolution in which it orders the capacity to be returned to the TSO and to be offered for sale. 

  1. d) From 1 July 2016 the application of the one-gas day firm “use it or lose it” mechanism shall not be considered as appropriate reason for not applying paragraph (a). 
  2. e) As a result of the take-back the network user loses the capacity booked for a given period of time or the unused capacity partially or fully for the remaining period of the contract. 
  3. f) The rights and obligations arising from the network usage contract shall be reserved by the network user until and to the extent any part of the capacity taken back is allocated again by the TSO of which the TSO shall immediately notify the network user. 
  4. g) The contractual rights and obligations of the network user, who has any capacity bookings for which capacity take-back procedure is launched pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) of Clause 8.7.2 of the Network Code, related to the capacity taken back and re-sold shall terminate from the gas day on which the rights and obligations related to the re-sold capacity are held and borne by the network user or network users re-booking the capacity. The network user returning the capacity shall not hold a share of the auction premium, if any. 
  5. h) The provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Clause 8.7.2 of the Network Code shall be applied to the capacities obtained in the secondary capacity market. In this case the provisions of paragraph (g) of Clause 8.7.2 of the Network Code regarding the capacity booking fee shall be enforced against the primary capacity booking network user, while with respect to the volume and odorization fee they shall be enforced against the network user to whom the capacity was transferred on the secondary market. With respect to the contractual relationship between the primary network user and the secondary network user participating in the secondary capacity market transaction, the TSO shall not be liable whatsoever, such contractual relationship shall not stipulate any obligations for the TSO. Following the completion of the take-back and the re-sale the primary network user and the secondary network user shall settle accounts with each other regarding their other rights and obligations arising from the secondary market transaction. 


Capacity increase through oversubscription and buy-back scheme

(a) If at an interconnection entry/exit point contractual congestion occurs with respect to a gas year, the TSO shall file a proposal with the Authority before 30 November of the year before the following gas year that shall contain an incentive based overbooking-repurchase mechanism as a result of which firm extra capacities can be offered in the system. If the proposed mechanism is approved by the Authority, the TSO shall implement such mechanism prior to the following gas year and offer extra capacity for booking for the following gas year before 31 December. Extra capacity shall mean the firm capacity offered over and above the technical capacity defined for the interconnection entry/exit point. 

(b) The overbooking-repurchase system shall encourage the TSO to make additional capacity available subject to the technical conditions, including combustion heat, the temperature, the expected consumption in the entry/exit system involved and the capacities available on neighboring networks. 

(c) The incentive system on which the overbooking-repurchase mechanism is based, should reflect the risk taken by the TSO in offering extra capacity. The mechanism shall be developed in a way that the TSO and the network users share the income from the sale of the extra capacity and the costs arising from the repurchase or the measures under paragraph (f). The Authority shall define the distribution of the income and the costs between the TSO and the network users. 

(d) When the income of the TSO is defined, the allocation of the technical capacity, in particular the returned capacity and capacity arising from the application of the long-term “use it or lose it” mechanisms, shall be considered to have taken place before that of the extra capacity, if any. 

(e) In defining the extra capacity the TSO shall take into consideration the statistical scenarios related to the possible quantities of capacities existing, but physically unused at the interconnection entry/exit points in different points of time. Furthermore, when offering extra capacity the TSO shall take into consideration a risk profile that does not entail excessive repurchase obligation. The overbooking-repurchase mechanism should provide an estimate of the possibility and costs of market capacity repurchases, and such estimate shall be taken into consideration in defining the value of the extra capacity offered. 

(f) If, in order to maintain the integrity of the system, it is necessary the TSO shall apply a transparent market based repurchase procedure that allows network users to offer capacities. Network users shall be notified of the repurchase procedure to be applied. The application of the repurchase procedure shall not affect the implementation of emergency measures. 

(g) Prior to the application of the repurchase procedure the TSO shall verify that the system integrity cannot be maintained through other technical and commercial measures in a more cost effective way. 

(h) The Authority may request the TSO to review the mechanism.